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Find Out If Your Domain Can Be Forged

Check your DMARC record and see whether receiving mail servers are actually told to block fake messages pretending to come from you.

DMARC lookuppublic dns

Confirmed against two independent resolvers. Reads the published record only.

1 of 8
categories checked

DMARC is only one piece of your external exposure. Fixing it well still leaves the other seven unanswered.

The Customer Cannot Tell the Difference

A forged invoice arrives looking exactly like yours. Nothing in the message tells the person reading it that every authentication check failed.

What your customer sees
Inbox · 3 Messages
  • SmithDental Office8:47 AMAppointment Reminder · See you Thursday at 2:30.
  • FromSmithDental Billing <[email protected]>9:12 AM
    Toyou
    SubjectUpdated Payment Information

    Hi, our records show your card on file has expired. Please update your payment details before your next visit.

  • LabQuest Results9:26 AMYour Results Are Ready · The panel from Monday is available.
What Blindspot sees
  • DMARC policyNone published
  • SPF resultSoft fail
  • DKIM signatureMissing
  • Sent by this companyNo
  • Delivered anywayYes
  • Anything shown to the readerNothing

What DMARC Decides

Three questions, answered in order. DMARC is the third one, and without it the first two produce evidence nobody acts on.

  1. Who is allowed to send as you?

    SPF lists the servers. DKIM signs the message. Together they produce a pass or a fail for every message claiming to be from your domain.

  2. What should happen when they fail?

    Your DMARC policy answers this: do nothing, send it to spam, or refuse it outright. This is the part most domains never publish.

  3. Are unknown senders actually blocked?

    Only if the policy says reject. A published record with no instruction looks handled and stops nobody.

Reading Your Result

  1. No DMARC Record

    Nothing tells receiving servers to refuse forged mail.

    Anyone can attempt to send email appearing to come from your domain, and most of it will be delivered.

  2. p=none

    A record exists and instructs servers to take no action.

    You can see the problem in reports, but receiving servers are not required to stop anything.

  3. p=quarantine

    Forged mail is directed to spam rather than the inbox.

    A real improvement. The message still arrives somewhere your customer can find it.

  4. p=reject

    Forged mail is refused outright.

    This is the setting that actually stops someone sending email in your name.

What a Record Looks Like

TXT record_dmarc.example.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s
p=reject refuses forged mail. rua is where the daily reports go. pct=100 applies the policy to all mail rather than a sample.

Fix It Without Breaking Your Business Email

  1. Check SPF and DKIM First

    DMARC reads their results. Publish it before either exists and it has nothing to act on.

  2. Start at p=none With a Reporting Address

    Nothing changes for any sender. You are only collecting data at this stage.

  3. Read the Reports for Two to Four Weeks

    This is where the forgotten services surface: the reminder tool, the invoicing platform, an old marketing account.

  4. Authorize the Real Senders

    Anything still failing after this is either an impostor or something nobody remembers signing up for.

  5. Move to Quarantine, Then Reject

    Tighten in stages. Jumping straight to reject is how a practice discovers its reminders were never authorized.

Why It Is Worth Ten Minutes

  • Impersonation Is Cheap

    Large companies enforce DMARC. A dental practice or a contractor usually does not, so they are the easier target.

  • It Does Not Look Like an Attack

    A fake invoice does not look like a technical failure. It looks like your company made a mistake.

  • The Money Does Not Come Back

    Your customer pays the wrong account, and the bank does not return it. The relationship absorbs the damage.

DMARC Is One of Eight

DMARC is only one piece of your external exposure. A domain can enforce it perfectly and still fail most of what a stranger can see.

Category Breakdown8 checked
FEmail Authenticationno DMARC policy
BCertificatesexpires in 41 days
DExposed Services1 portal reachable
FBreach Exposure6 accounts found
BDNS Hygiene2 stale records
CLookalike Domains1 with mail
CWebsite Headers3 missing
ATracking Leakagenothing sensitive
8 sourcesconfirmed twicetoday

Common Questions

  • Yes. DMARC works by checking their results, so a DMARC record without at least one of them properly configured has nothing to evaluate.

  • It can if you move to reject before confirming every legitimate sender passes. That is why the staged approach exists. At p=none nothing changes for anyone.

  • No. DMARC protects against impersonation of your exact domain. It does not prevent a compromised mailbox, a lookalike domain one character different, or exposure in other categories. That is why Blindspot checks eight of them rather than one.

  • Publishing is a DNS change that takes about ten minutes. Reading the reports before tightening the policy is the part that takes weeks.

  • No. This is not a penetration test. It reads public records only, specifically the DMARC record published in your domain's DNS, which anyone can look up. Nothing is logged into, no password is tested, and no network is touched.

Your Email Is Only One Door

DMARC answers one question. Blindspot answers the other seven.

The scan is not open to the public yet. Nothing here is collected in the meantime.

We only read public records. We never touch your computers and we never ask for a password.

Explore

Everything Blindspot Checks

Understand Your Exposure

What the outside world can already see, and how it is measured.

How Impersonation Works

The techniques behind the findings, in plain English.